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AbstractIn general, human being are rational decision makers, but in many situations, they exhibit unexplained inertia,
reluctance to switch to a better decision. In this paper, we show
that this seemingly irrational behavior can be explained if we take
uncertainty into account; we also explain how this phenomenon

In the rst case,

• if we originally only had an alternative
are adding the alternative

I. T RADITIONAL A PPROACH TO H UMAN D ECISION
M AKING : A B RIEF R EMINDER
In the traditional approach to decision making (see, e.g.,

A1 , . . . , An can
be characterized by their utility values u(A1 ), . . . , u(An ),
so that an alternative Ai is preferable to the alternative Aj if
and only if u(Ai ) > u(Aj ).
[4], [13]), the decision maker's preferences

Ai ,

and then we

then we stick with

Ai ;

• on the other hand, if we originally only had an alternative

Aj ,

can be utilized in education.

Aj ,

and then we are adding the alternative

switch our choice to

Ai ,

then we

Ai .

Similarly, in the second case,

• if we originally only had an alternative
are adding the alternative

Ai ,

Aj ,

and then we

then we stick with

Aj ;

• on the other hand, if we originally only had an alternative

Ai ,

and then we are adding the alternative

switch our choice to

Aj ,

then we

Aj .

These two cases can be summarized in the following 2-stage
II. E MPIRICAL T ESTING OF THE T RADITIONAL A PPROACH
TO

D ECISION M AKING IS NOT E ASY

The traditional approach to decision making is a theoretical description of human behavior. Since its appearance,
researchers have been testing to what extent this approach

experiment: In the rst stage,

• rst, we present the decision maker with only one alternative

Ai ;

the decision maker does not have a choice, so

he or she selects this alternative

Ai ;

• after that, we provide the decision maker with another

adequately describe the actual behavior of human decision

possible alternative

Aj ;

so now the decision maker has

makers.

two alternatives

Ai

and

Aj .

Such a testing is not easy, since the traditional approach
relates an empirically testable behavior (such as preferring
one alternative

Ai

to another alternative

Aj ) with the difcult-

to-test comparison between the (usually unknown) utility
values.

We then record the user's choice in this rst stage.
After some amount of time, we start with the second stage
of our experiment:

• rst, we present the decision maker with only one alternative

III. A T ESTABLE C ONSEQUENCE OF THE T RADITIONAL
A PPROACH TO D ECISION M AKING
Although a direct test of the traditional approach to decision making is not easy, some testable consequences of the
traditional approach can be derived.

Aj ;

the decision maker does not have a choice, so

Aj ;
• after that, we provide the user with another possible alterhe or she selects this alternative
native

Ai

Ai , so now the decision maker has two alternatives
Aj .

and

We then record the user's choice in this second stage.

For example, in the traditional approach, unless the two

According to the above-described traditional approach to

Ai and Aj have the exact same utility value
u(Ai ) = u(Aj ), we have two possibilities:
• either u(Ai ) > u(Aj ), i.e., the alternative Ai is better,
• or u(Aj ) > u(Ai ), i.e., the alternative Aj is better.

decision making, on both stages, the decision maker should

alternatives

make the same choice:

• if the alternative

Ai

has a larger utility value, then on

both stages, the decision maker should chose

Ai ;

• on the other hand, if the alternative

Aj

has a larger utility

value, then on both stages, the decision maker should
chose

Aj .
AGREEMENT WITH C OMMON S ENSE

The above behavior not only follows from the mathematics
of the traditional decision making, it is also in perfect agreement with common sense.
Indeed, unless the two alternatives

Ai

and

Aj

either the rst one is better or the second one is better.
So, on both stages of the above experiment, a rational
decision maker should make the same choice:

• if to this decision maker, the alternative

Aj , then
chose Ai ;

to the alternative
maker should

option

Ai

Ai

is better than the new option

is preferable

on both stages, the decision

Aj .

However, at the same time, a very similar group of employees was presented with a different scenario:

• Originally, the employees had only one option: retirement

Aj .

• After this, an additional option

Ai

is introduced.

• In spite of this new option, most employees decided to
keep the old option

Aj .

Since we concluded that for most employees, the option
better than the option

Aj ,

is preferable to the alternative

the decision maker should chose

Ai , then on both stages,
Aj .

V. F OR C LOSE A LTERNATIVES , D ECISION M AKERS D O
N OT B EHAVE IN T HIS R ATIONAL FASHION
Interestingly, in the actual tests of the above experiment,
human decision makers do not follow this seemingly rational
behavior; see, e.g., [3], [6], [7], [12]. Specically, they exhibit
inertia, the desire not to change an alternative.
Namely, if the alternatives are close in value, then the
decision makers exhibit the following behavior in our twostage experiment. In the rst stage,

Ai

from this second group to switch from the original option
to the new option

Ai .

Aj

However, in reality, most employees

Aj .

In behavioral economics, this inertial behavior is called
present-biased preferences: whatever options we have selected
at present biases our future choices.
VI. M AYBE H UMAN B EHAVIOR I S I RRATIONAL ?
How can we explain this seemingly irrational behavior? One
possible explanation is that many people do often make bad
(irrational) decisions: waste money on gambling, waste one's
health or alcohol and drugs, etc.
However, the above inertial behavior occurs not only among
decision makers who exhibit self-destructive irrational behavior, it is a common phenomenon which occurs among the most
successful people as well.

• rst, we present the decision maker with only one alterthe decision maker does not have a choice, so

he or she selects this alternative

Ai ;

• after that, we provide the decision maker with another

It is therefore reasonable to look for an explanation of this
seemingly irrational behavior. It turns out that we can come up
with such an explanation if we take into account uncertainty
related to decision making.

possible alternative

Aj ;

so now the decision maker has

Ai

and

Aj .

VII. H OW TO TAKE I NTO ACCOUNT U NCERTAINTY IN

On this stage, most decision makers continue to stick to the

D ECISION M AKING S ITUATIONS

two alternatives

original choice

Ai .

Each alternative decision can lead to different possible

After some amount of time, we perform the second stage
of our experiment:

Aj ;

the decision maker does not have a choice, so

he or she selects this alternative

Aj ;

• after that, we provide the user with another possible alter-

Ai , so now the decision maker has two alternatives
Ai and Aj .
native

On this stage, most decision makers continue to stick to the
original choice

Aj .

curred is the employees' choice between two nancial retire-

Ai

and

Aj .

• A more conservative retirement plan  e.g., investing
all the retirement money in the government-guaranteed
bonds  will not lead to a large increase of the invested
amount, but, on the positive side, has a smaller probability
of losing the retirement money.

• On the other hand, a riskier retirement plan  e.g.,

Ai .

• After this, an additional option

larger probability of failing, but it can also lead to a much
larger amount of money available for retirement.
In the traditional approach to decision making, we rst

• Originally, the employees had only one option: retirement
plan

decision maker by the moment of his or her retirement:

investing all the retirement money into stocks  has a

An example where such seemingly irrational behavior ocment plans

situations. For example, a decision about selecting a nancial
retirement plan can lead to different amounts available to the

• rst, we present the decision maker with only one alternative

is

we would expect most employees

from this second group stayed with their original option

• on the other hand, if to this decision maker, the alternative

Ai ;

Ai .

can simply conclude that for most employees, the original

plan
are absolutely

equivalent for the decision maker (which happens very rarely),

native

keep the old option

This, by itself, is not inconsistent with rational behavior: we

IV. T HE A BOVE T ESTABLE C ONSEQUENCE IS IN P ERFECT

Aj

• In spite of this new option, most employees decided to

estimate the utilities
quences

Aj

is introduced.

c1 , . . . , cm

U1 , . . . , Um

of different possible conse-

of our actions  e.g., the utilities of having

different amounts of money by the time of the retirement 

and then estimate the utility of each alternative decision as the
expected value of this utility:

In real life, we do not know the exact values of these
we only know them with uncertainty.

Usually, we only know the approximate estimates of these
probabilities. In some cases, we have bounds

these

probabilities,

i.e.,

we

know

intervals

In other situations, we have expert estimates of the unknown
Such expert estimates can be naturally

described by fuzzy numbers. In this case, the resulting utility

u(A)

is also a fuzzy number.

of bounds for the unknown probability (and, as a result, for

u(A)),

we can provide different bounds which are

In other words, for each such quantity (probability or
utility), instead of a single interval, we get a nested family
of condence intervals corresponding to different levels of
uncertainty. Nested families are, in effect, equivalent to fuzzy
numbers; see, e.g., [2], [5], [9], [11], so this natural idea of
representing uncertainty is indeed mathematically equivalent
to using fuzzy numbers.

P REFERENCES

known) utilities

u(Ai )

and

u(Aj )

ui ∈ ui

and

uj ∈ uj

for which

ui < uj ,

and

• there are also values
u0i > u0j .

u0i ∈ ui

and

u
ei

u0j ∈ uj

and

u
ej

for which

are close, all

• it is possible that the alternatives

Ai

and

Aj

have exactly

the same utility to the decision maker;

• it is possible that for this decision maker, the alternative

Ai

leads to better results than

Aj ;

Aj

leads to better results than

Ai .

Switching to a different alternative usually has a cost, a
small but still a cost. For example, in the case of a nancial
retirement plan, there is a trader's charge for selling stocks
and for buying government bonds (and vice versa). Thus, it
only makes sense to perform this switch if we are reasonably

and

i.e., in utility terms, to the larger value of utility.
If the utility estimates are close, i.e., if

|e
ui − u
ej | < 2ε,

we

have no guarantee that the new alternative is indeed better than

u
ej

to the original choice  exactly as actual decision makers are
doing.
Comment. On the other hand, if one of the estimates is much
larger than the other, it makes sense to switch.
Specically, if

u
ei > u
ej + 2ε,

then every value

u(Ai ) ∈ ui = [e
ui − ε, u
ei + ε]
is larger than every value

VIII. U NCERTAINTY E XPLAINS P RESENT-B IASED

u
ei

• there are values

the previously selected one. In this case, it is prudent to stick

valid with different degrees of condence.

When the approximate estimates

 i.e., that the

sure that switching will indeed lead to a better alternative 

Comment. In effect, fuzziness means that instead of single pair
the utility

u(Aj )

and of

that in this case:

alternative

[p(c1 | A), p(c1 | A)] · U1 + . . . + [p(cm | A), p(cm | A)] · Um .

estimate

u(Ai )

corresponding utilities may be equal. Similarly, we can show

• it is also possible that for this decision maker, the

[u(A), u(A)] =

p(ck | A).

Thus, the fact that these

three situations are possible:

[p(ck | A), p(ck | A)] that contain the (unknown) probabilities
p(ck | A). In such situations, for each alternative A, instead
of a single value u(A), we get an interval of possible values:

probabilities

u(Aj ).

In other words, when the estimates

p(ck | A) ≤ p(ck | A) ≤ p(ck | A)
on

and

number is a value of both

p(ck | A) is the conditional probability of the consequence ck under the condition that we select an alternative A.
where

p(ck | A),

u(Ai )

intervals intersect means that it is possible that the same real

u(A) = p(c1 | A) · U1 + . . . + p(cm | A) · Um ,

probabilities

These intervals represent the set of possible values for,
correspondingly,

u(Aj ) ∈ uj = [e
uj − ε, u
ej + ε].
for the (un-

are close, this, due to the

uncertainty, means that it is quite possible that the actual

u(Ai ) and u(Aj ) are equal. It is also possible that
u(Ai ) > u(Aj ) and it is also possible that u(Aj ) > u(Ai ).
values

Let us illustrate these possibilities on a simple example
where every estimate has the exact same accuracy

ε.

In

other words, we know that |u(Ai ) − u
ei | ≤ ε and that
|u(Aj ) − u
ej | ≤ ε. In this case, based on the estimate u
ei for
u(Ai ), the only information that we have about the actual
(unknown) value of the utility u(Ai ) is that this value belongs
def
to the interval ui = [e
ui − ε, u
ei + ε]. Similarly, based on
the estimate u
ej for u(Aj ), the only information that we have
about the actual (unknown) value of the utility u(Aj ) is that
def
this value belongs to the interval uj = [e
uj − ε, u
ej + ε].
When the estimates u
ei and u
ej are close  to be more precise,
when |e
ui − u
ej | < 2ε  the intervals ui and uj intersect.

u(Ai ) > u(Aj ). Thus,
Aj , it makes
alternative Ai .

In this case, we are guaranteed that

if our original choice was the worse alternative
sense to switch to a better

IX. A NALOGY WITH I NTERVAL -VALUED C ONTROL OF A
M OBILE ROBOT
The rationality is inertia under uncertainty can be illustrated
on the example of a similar situation: how an intelligent mobile
robot makes decisions about its motion.
In the traditional control, we make decisions based on the
current values of the quantities. For example, when controlling
a mobile robot, we make decisions about changing its trajectory based on the moment-by-moment measurements of this
robot's location and/or velocity. Measurements are never 100%
accurate; the resulting measurement noise leads to random
deviations of the robot from the ideal trajectory  shaking
and wobbling. Since each change in direction requires that

Aj

energy from the robot's battery go to the robot's motor, this

there is no guarantee that the new choice

wobbling drains the batteries and slows down the robot's

mathematical terms, this means that the smallest possible value

motion.

uj

A natural way to avoid this wobbling is to change a direction

is better. In

corresponding to the new choice does not exceed the largest

possible value

ui

corresponding to the original choice:

only if it is absolutely clear (beyond the measurement uncertainty) that this change will improve the robot's performance.

uj ≤ ui .

The idea was one of the several interval-related ideas that in

For fuzzy numbers, we can get a similar answer for not

1997, led our university robotic team to the 1st place in the

switching with a given condence, if we similarly compare

robotic competitions organized by the American Association

the intervals (α-cuts) for

for Articial Intelligence (AAAI); see, e.g., [8]. A similar idea

this given condence level.

u(Ai )

and

u(Aj )

corresponding to

also improves the motion of interval-valued fuzzy control; see,
XII. P OTENTIAL A PPLICATIONS TO E DUCATION

e.g., [10], [15], [16].

As of now, the asymmetric paternalism techniques have

X. A SYMMETRIC PATERNALISM : P RACTICAL

been used in economic and medical situations [1], [6], [14]. In

A PPLICATION OF P RESENT-B IASED P REFERENCES
At rst glance, one may think that the above explanation
is of purely theoretical value: OK, we explained how people
actually make decisions. How does that help in practice?
The reason why we got interested in coming up with
this explanation is that the phenomenon of present-biases
preferences is actually actively used in practice. This use is
called asymmetric paternalism; see, e.g., [1], [6], [14]. Let us
explain how this application works.
Suppose that we have two types of behavior, one slightly
worse for an individual, and one slightly better. For example,
when thirsty, a kid can drink either a healthy fruit juice or a
soda drink which has no health value. Our intent is to enforce

our opinion, this phenomenon can also be efciently applied
to education.
For example, it is well known that when the students just
come to class from recess or from home, it is difcult to get
their attention. On the other hand, once they get engaged in
the class material, it is difcult for them to stop when the bell
rings. To take advantage of this phenomenon, it is desirable
to start a class with engaging fun material; once the students
got into the studying state

switch to a passive state

by prohibiting all other choices. Alas, practice has shown that
in many cases, this literal enforcement does not work.

The authors are thankful to the anonymous referees for
valuable suggestions.

It turns out that much better results can be achieved if
we at rst provide only the desired alternative  and then
gradually introduce all the other alternatives. For example,
we have only healthy drinks for the rst few weeks of a
school orientation, but then we allow all the choices. Due to
the present-biased preferences, kids will tend to stick to their
original healthier choice without the need for strict (and nonworking) enforcement. Experience shows that this approach
really works; see, e.g., [1], [14].
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